A different vision of openness: The Chinese Internet

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Draft
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• China’s vision of the Internet and openness

• Structure of control

• Vertical integration of control
Freedom of speech is important to everyone...

The West considers freedom of speech a universal right

• “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” –UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The Chinese Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, too

• “Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.” –Constitution of the P.R.C.
...but not everyone agrees what freedom of speech means

“Chinese citizens fully enjoy freedom of speech on the Internet.”
– The Internet in China, Chinese government white paper, June 2010

“By November... 350m pieces of harmful information, including text, pictures and videos, had been deleted... there was a notable improvement in the online cultural environment.”
– Wang Chen, deputy head of the Communist party’s propaganda department and head of the State Council Information Office
Different priorities drive Chinese management of the Internet

The West considers Internet freedom a political priority

• “On their own, new technologies do not take sides in the struggle for freedom and progress, but the United States does. We stand for a single internet where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and ideas.” – Hillary Clinton, January 21, 2010

China emphasizes the Internet’s potential for economic development

• “The Chinese government has... endeavored to create a healthy and harmonious Internet environment, and build an Internet that is more reliable, useful, and conducive to economic and social development... National situations and cultural traditions differ among countries, and so concern about Internet security also differs. Concerns about Internet security of different countries should be fully respected.” – *The Internet in China*, Chinese government white paper, June 2010
A brief lesson on Chinese politics

• Top priority is stability, or preservation of Communist Party rule

• Party legitimacy has two pillars: economic development and territorial integrity

• China has a history of social unrest leading to revolution

The ideal Internet is a walled garden that promotes growth and social stability
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General Principles of Control

- Push responsibility and implementation downward
- Create multiple levers to enable fine-grained control
- Rely on the panopticon and deterrence
Organizational control structure includes Party, government, and quangos

• Three-part structure with overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities

• Power delegated downward and outward

• Large role played by Beijing Party and government organs due to basing of major national commercial websites and ISPs in Beijing

Notes: “Tug of War over China’s Cyberspace,” China Human Rights Defenders, March 13, 2009
Regulatory bodies use a variety of tools of control

• Licenses, registrations, and permits
  – Online forums must register with MIIT and have stand-alone servers placed in a room of a company certified by Communications Management Bureau
  – Only companies partially or wholly owned by the state can provide Internet audio and video services, and only with permits from SARFT and MIIT

• Cyber 110 ‘virtual police’ icons
• ‘Point system’ for commercial ISPs and websites
• Strict rules on who is allowed to print articles from where
• Internal third-party monitoring

But the government often chooses to act through quangos instead

Notes: “Tug of War over China’s Cyberspace”; The Internet in China White Paper, June 2010
Policy implementation often left to quangos and society

Self-regulation considered optimal because it is ‘voluntary’

- Internet Society of China (ISC) Public Pledges of Self Regulation on professional ethics, pornography, anti-malicious software, blogs, viruses, copyrights
- 233 domain name registrars signed a code of conduct at the request of the China Internet network Information Center
- Beijing Internet News and Information Council required public apologies by companies that breached undefined regulations

The Beijing Association of Online Media, under direction of the Beijing IPMO, recruits citizens to police the Internet

- “Internet Surveillance Volunteers” must report 50 items of “harmful” information each month with URLs and screenshots
- “50-cent gang” of Internet commentators “guide public opinion” from a surveillance center at Beijing IPMO, with 1-3 per major commercial website

Notes: “Tug of War over China’s Cyberspaces”
Internet monitoring mechanism reflects political and social structure

Internet control relies upon the panopticon effect and deterrence effect of high-profile cases

Downward delegation of responsibility ensures that websites and ISPs have an incentive to monitor their users and err on the side of caution
Technical means of censorship: an ongoing arms race

Great Firewall (Golden Shield)
  • Block websites and ports (IP blocking, DNS filtering and redirection)
  • Restrict keywords and searches (URL filtering, packet filtering)
  • TCP resets
  • Block commercial subscription VPNs

Green Dam project (now abandoned) attempted to install censorship software directly onto new computers when sold

Malware attacks against journalists, dissidents, NGOs
  • Spear fishing
  • Hacking into email accounts

How to better understand the evolution of the arms race and arsenal?

Notes: “The 10 Tools of Online Oppressors,” Committee to Protect Journalists, May 2, 2011
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China has vertically integrated control along the value chain

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<tr>
<th>Equipment provider</th>
<th>Access provider</th>
<th>Service provider</th>
<th>Application developers</th>
<th>Consumer devices</th>
<th>Content providers</th>
<th>Users</th>
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<td>• Relationship with Huawei</td>
<td>• State-owned infrastructure</td>
<td>• 8.3M km of fiber</td>
<td>• Most Web 2.0 applications blocked, e.g., Facebook, Twitter</td>
<td>• Green Dam</td>
<td>• List of “Approved Media News Sources”</td>
<td>• Arrests and disappearances of bloggers and dissidents</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 8.3M km of fiber</td>
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<td>• Favor open source platforms</td>
<td>• Registration of SIM chips</td>
<td>• Only state-owned outlets can post Internet video</td>
<td>• Attacks on journalists and dissident email accounts</td>
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<td>• State-owned infrastructure</td>
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<td>• Promotion of domestic alternatives: Alibaba’s Taobao and Alipay, Tencent’s QQ, Baidu, Sina’s Weibo.com, Renren.com</td>
<td>• Registration required at Internet cafes</td>
<td>• Internal third-party monitoring</td>
<td>• Online surveillance: ‘Big Mamas’, 110 Cyber police, 50-cent gang</td>
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<td>• Collaborations with others, e.g., Facebook</td>
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Notes: “Tug of War over China’s Cyberspace”; The Internet in China White Paper
Next steps

So where do we go from here?