Wireless is Changing the Policy Calculus for Municipal Broadband

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Abstract

Historically, the justification for municipal provisioning of "last mile" infrastructure has focused on the natural monopoly aspect of wireline infrastructure (e.g., FTTH or small size of market). Growing interest in WISPs, municipal hot spots, and access to public buildings/space for siting base stations suggest new and expanded opportunities or roles for community ownership of last-mile services. This paper examines the implications of emerging wireless technologies for the policy debate over whether municipalities should be playing an active role in providing last mile broadband services, and if so, what the nature of that role should be.

I. Introduction

In the United States and abroad, there has been renewed interest in local governments playing a more direct role in providing communications infrastructure and services in their communities.¹ A number of forces have contributed to this trend. First, there is the perception that access to advanced communication services, including broadband data services, constitutes essential infrastructure that is critical for the economic and social health of communities. Continuing innovation in computing and communications technology and the growth of the Internet and eCommerce have made data services increasingly important in modern life.

Second, regulatory reform and industry convergence during the mid-1990s has changed the dynamics of competition in last-mile access services. Open access rules have reduced entry barriers and technical and industry convergence have enhanced

¹ See, Gillett, Lehr, and Osorio (2003), Barranca (2004), or Clark and Baker (2003).
opportunities for cross-platform competition (e.g., fixed line v. mobile telephone, telephone v. cable television, POTS v. Voice-over-IP).²

Third, in spite of the great promise and hopes for increased competition and ubiquitous availability of inexpensive broadband local access services, the crash of the dot.coms and the global recession in telecommunications that began during 2000, raised concern that the private-sector might fail to invest widely enough or fast enough in delivering the needed next-generation facilities.³

Fourth, and finally, there is growing awareness that next generation communications infrastructure, capable of delivering a bundle of high-speed services, may be a natural monopoly in at least some communities.⁴

At the same time, wireless technology and services are changing rapidly and becoming more important as all types of networks continue to grow. A plethora of wireless networking technologies and services are being deployed by incumbent service providers, new service providers, end-users, and municipalities. In our companion paper in this issue, we provide an introduction to the technologies in this changing wireless landscape.⁵

These developments in wireless services are changing the landscape for municipal networking. A better understanding of the intersection of these converging trends will help local governments craft policies for supporting increased access to broadband data services. As we explain further below, wireless may increase or decrease local government’s incentives to directly invest in providing municipal communication services. On the one hand, the opportunities for new types of competition from investor-owned firms reduce the need for direct government involvement. On the other hand, wireless can enhance opportunities for local governments to promote economic development, expand the accessibility of services it is already providing, and can lower the costs of extending ubiquitous coverage in those areas that remain underserved. In the absence of wireless alternatives, local communities that were interested in providing communications infrastructure were often deterred by the high costs of deploying and servicing wired outside plant facilities. In the “pre-wireless” world, the communities that have been most likely to make the leap into providing telecommunication services have been those with Municipal Electric Utilities (MEUs)⁶ accustomed to pulling wire. Wireless expands the range of communities that are finding it feasible to consider

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² In the United States, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TA96) opened last-mile telephone networks to competition with mandatory resale and unbundling provisions. Analogous pro-competitive regulatory reforms were underway around the globe (in the European Community, UK, Japan, etc.).

³ See Baller and Stokes (2001).

⁴ See CSTB (2002) or Lehr and Hubbard (2003).


⁶ See Gillett, Lehr, and Osorio (2003) and Osorio (2004).
offering communication services, and is expanding the range of trajectories by which local communication services are evolving.\(^7\)

Whether municipal entry is desirable – compatible with private sector competition or better than private alternatives – remains a hotly debated question. Incumbent cable television and telephone companies have often opposed municipal entry into communication services as representing an unfair form of government-subsidized competition.\(^8\) On the other side, proponents of local autonomy, community-based networking, and economic development have argued in favor of a larger role for local government in providing communications services.\(^9\) In the United States, a number of states have passed laws restricting local government entry into communication services and the debate is on-going as to whether public policy ought to promote or restrict municipal entry.\(^10\) Regardless of one’s position on this debate, it is important to understand the impact of wireless.

Additionally, when one views a municipal network as an alternative model for “edge-based” network infrastructure to evolve, a better understanding of wireless municipal networking is important for understanding the economics for broadband access and for possible ways in which broadband infrastructure may evolve. For example, the debate over spectrum reform has focused on the benefits of adopting a regulatory regime based on licensed or unlicensed (so-called, “open access”) spectrum.\(^11\) This has been cast variously as a debate between “property rights v. commons” or as “service provider-based infrastructure v. end-user controlled networking.”\(^12\) The success of WiFi and “free nets,” the growth of open source computing, and growing interest in new types of mesh and ad hoc networking technologies are helping to fuel interest in alternative industry structures for supporting our communications infrastructure. At the risk of oversimplification, the debate may be caricaturized as a battle between the traditional service provider business model for providing network services versus one based on end-user equipment. In the former, a service-provider owns a large, fixed/sunk cost network that it uses to provide shared access services to a large number of end-user nodes in return for usage-fees. In the latter, the edge-nodes are both end-users and relay points that may be interconnected into a mesh to provide wide-area connectivity. In the most extreme version, there is no centralized network coordination. Instead, the “network” grows “virally” as end-users add equipment to the network.

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\(^7\) See Sandvig (2004) for discussion of wireless cooperatives. Also, even among MEU communities, wireless is affecting strategies for deploying infrastructure.

\(^8\) See Rizzutto and Wirth (1998) or Sappington and Sidak (2003).


\(^10\) For further discussion of Federal and state policies impacting municipal entry into telecommunications services, see related papers in this issue. [WHICH PAPERS??].


\(^12\) See Benkler (2002) or Werbach (2003).
In the balance of this paper, we examine the traditional economic justifications for municipal provisioning of local broadband access services (Section II). This provides a basis for understanding how emerging trends in wireless change the decision-making calculus for municipal entry.

In Section III, we discuss how the changing landscape for wireless technology changes the policy and industry economics associated with municipal entry into telecommunications services. First, we note that wireless, by lowering costs, helps stimulate demand for municipal investment in computing and communications infrastructure and services, which absent countervailing effects (e.g., regulation that blocks such entry) suggests that the municipal role in providing local communication services is likely to increase. Second, we note that the principal economic justification for municipal provisioning – the “market failure” rationale – is impacted in complex and ambiguous ways by wireless. This suggests a need for further research, and caution when considering evaluating policies that restrict or encourage municipal entry. Third, we note that the diversity of wireless options available means that municipalities face a complex decision environment. No single wireless approach is best in all circumstances, and the choices of a technology, architecture, and business model will be interrelated with each other, and with the communities decision horizon and objectives. For example, a community may decide to deploy a MAN-sized Broadband Fixed Wireless Access (BFWA) based on a technology with relatively large cell sizes (as exemplified by the technology from Alvarion) or one based on the mesh-style technologies associated with smaller, more dense cell sizes (as exemplified by the technology from Tropos, MeshNetworks, or Motorola’s Canopy system). Alternatively, the community may limit its role to assisting in the promotion of grass-roots efforts to extend broadband access via viral growth via interconnected private and public hot spots.

Section IV summarizes our key conclusions and suggests directions for future research.

II. Understanding the Municipal Role in Providing Communications Infrastructure

Municipal entry into communication services may be justified economically in three basic ways: (1) as a response to a market failure; (2) as part of the local government’s role in providing basic infrastructure services; or (3) as a way to opportunistically take advantage of scale or scope economies afforded by investments or services that were put in place for another reason.

A. Market failure rationale

According to the “market failure” rationale, government intervention may be justified if private alternatives are perceived to be inadequate. The costs of deploying

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13 This discussion builds on the discussion of wireless trends presented in Sirbu, Lehr, and Gillett (2005), note 5 supra.
infrastructure and operating services may be too high relative to the revenue that can be expected so that an insufficient number of private sector providers enter the market.

In the most extreme cases, it may be uneconomic for any private carrier to offer service. Or, it may be a natural monopoly/oligopoly that results in inadequate service provisioning. In either case, the "market failure to support adequate competitive alternatives" can provide a justification for municipal ownership. Obvious examples of such communities are rural communities (low density so high cost) and economically undeveloped (low ability to pay for services).

In the US, it is rare to find communities without any private sector telephone service, however there are a number of communities that are not served by wired broadband (neither DSL nor cable modem) or video distribution (no cable tv). Among the communities that have private cable or broadband providers, there are a number that are unsatisfied with the quality/price of service from the private carriers, and look to municipally-owned providers to expand competitive choices. In a number of cases, such communities have found private carriers either unwilling or too slow to deploy new infrastructure or to provide ubiquitous coverage, or have been unhappy with the quality of service provided. We have found this last to have been an important factor especially with respect to cable television services.

Finally, in light of the need for new investment required to put in place next generation broadband infrastructure (i.e., supporting data rates in the 10s to 100s of Mbps instead of today’s generation of DSL/cable modem services which support at most a few Mbps) and in response to the global telecommunications recession that began in 2000 and the collapse of much of the competitive local exchange (CLEC) industry, there is a concern that the private sector will fail to invest in providing for next generation services or that the economics of competition for next generation services will increase the likelihood of a market failure (e.g., while DSL/cable modem-grade broadband may be competitive,\textsuperscript{14} FTTx may remain a natural monopoly\textsuperscript{15}).

Moreover, if there is a natural monopoly, it is unclear where this might occur. For example, it might be in the final access connection or at some point further up the network. For example, the natural monopoly may arise at the level of the individual household connection (the so-called, “last-mile”) or it may occur at the point of interconnection with wider-area networks (the so-called, “middle-mile”). In the former case, it may be uneconomic for multiple infrastructure providers to deploy fiber all the

\textsuperscript{14} In the near future, there will be a growing number of deployments of broadband-over-powerlines, 3G mobile services, and enhanced satellite-based wireless data services that will offer alternatives for today’s generation of wired DSL/cable modem services at data rates in the range of a few 100Kbps to a few Mbps. The ability of these competitors to scale to higher data rates and the economic viability of sustaining robust competition among higher data rate access platforms (offering speeds in the 10s to 100s of Mbps or even Gbps) remains suspect.

\textsuperscript{15} FTTx stands for Fiber-to-the-x where “x” may be the home (FTTH), the curb (FTTC), or to some other location in the neighborhood. Increasingly, traditional wireline carriers and others are deploying fiber transmission facilities that can provide the basis for very high speed feeder and access services.
way to the home or even into the neighborhood. Because of the high fixed and sunk cost component associated with operating wired local access facilities, whoever deploys first may realize critical first-mover advantages that deter subsequent entry;\textsuperscript{16} or alternatively, even if both the cable carrier and local telco deploy neighborhood fiber, it may turn out that the resulting competition (“Bertrand”) is so severe that neither carrier can realize revenues sufficient to sustain investment in expanding capabilities and services. If this is the case, municipal ownership of the fiber infrastructure may make sense.

It is also possible that there may be a market failure associated with providing “middle mile” services. For example, while each house may be adequately served with far less capacity than is provided by a FTTH system, there may be significant economies of scope and scale associated with aggregating traffic from multiple homes and connecting these neighborhoods to wider area networks. These backhaul costs are an important operating cost for small-scale ISPs. If the market failure is associated with a “natural monopoly” in middle-mile costs, then it may make sense for the municipality to own the local access backbone infrastructure, and for it to provide this as a platform for competitive retail entry to provide last-mile and end-to-end service connectivity to individual households or businesses.

The existence of a “market failure” need not imply that the municipality needs to own and operate a local communications network. Indeed, the long-held belief that local telephone services and cable television constituted natural monopolies has justified public utility regulation of incumbent local telephone companies and municipally-franchised cable television operators. While public ownership is an alternative, it has been more common to use subsidies and restrictive regulation (e.g., universal service, carrier-of-last-resort obligations, rate of return or price cap retail price regulation) to control the behavior of investor-owned utilities. A similar approach has been common in electric power, where most power is provided by investor-owned utilities; although with power, there are a large number of communities that are served by MEUs.\textsuperscript{17} Even when the telephone company has been publicly owned (as was the case in many countries outside the U.S.), its scope of operation and regulation has been national or at least encompassing multiple communities.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, the role of local government in providing communication services is relatively new.

Furthermore, even if a local government does decide to invest in local access infrastructure, this does not mean that the municipality needs to provide end-to-end retail services. There are a variety of business models available for how a municipality may offer such services. These include:

\textsuperscript{16} See Banerjee and Sirbu (2003)

\textsuperscript{17} MEUs first emerged to provide street lighting over a century ago, and then later, as part of efforts to provide power to under-served (mostly rural) areas (see Osorio, 2004).

\textsuperscript{18} There are a large number of small independent local telephone companies in the United States, however most of these are investor-owned, and collectively, these account for a relatively small number of the total access lines served.
• (1) Retail service model: the municipality offers retail services to consumers over infrastructure that it owns and operates. Examples of these include MEUs that are currently offering advanced communication services to local businesses and residences such as BLD in Braintree, MA. With wireless, there are additional community entities (other than an MEU) that could participate in owning and operating such services, including a local educational institution.

• (2) Wholesale service model: the municipality owns and operates a local access network which provides a wholesale access platform for retail ISPs and other communication service providers to use. As noted earlier this may be a complete Metropolitan Area Network (MAN), a back-bone (middle-mile) local access network, or last-mile access network. The “wholesale” service might be limited to dark fiber, or include advanced transport services (e.g., layer 2 VLANs, MPLS VPNs, or routed IP traffic). Under the constraint of state law which requires open access, a number of utilities in Washington state are deploying open access infrastructure (e.g., Grant County, WA).

• (3) Franchisee model: the municipality contracts with a private firm to build and operate the facilities. This is similar to the traditional model of municipally-franchised cable television service, but wireless alters the range of players that might be considered and the architectures/services that might be offered.

• (4) Real estate model: the municipality provides access to conduit or public rights-of-way. In the wired-world, this includes access for stringing or burying cables; while in the wireless world, it includes locations for siting antennas. In this model, the municipality partners with private providers to deliver end-to-end services to consumers.

• (5) Coordination model: the municipality can provide a nexus for demand aggregation (e.g., buyer groups) or for coordinating efforts of community networking (WiFi cooperatives).

The goal of this paper is not to determine whether municipalities should enter, or if they choose to enter, how best to enter. Instead, the goal is to explore how different wireless technologies might impact these decisions.

B. Basic infrastructure rationale

According to the "basic infrastructure" rationale, municipal networks may be justified as just another example of community provision of basic infrastructure services. These are services that are (1) used by everybody and are perceived as essential services; (2) may be a natural monopoly or have a public goods aspect (i.e., excluding non-paying

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19 See Gillett, Lehr, and Osorio (2003) for numerous examples.

20 There are many ways in which the wholesale model may be implemented, and the discussion of open access regimes is beyond the scope of this paper. See Gillett, Lehr, and Sirbu (2004, forthcoming).

21 See Gillett, Lehr, and Osorio (2003). Typically, local government is one of the heaviest local users of telecommunication services and it can use its monopsony power as an anchor tenant to induce private carriers to provide services.

users is costly); and (3) provide important spill-over benefits that are central to or complementary to the role of government. Obvious examples include roads and water and sewage systems. While these could be provided via regulated private contractors, such an approach is relatively rare. Other basic infrastructure services include electric power and gas distribution and public transportation. With these services, we see examples of both public and private sector provisioning. For example, while most electric power is provided via investor-owned utilities, there are still a large number of communities with municipal electric companies. Similarly, there are a number of communities with municipally-owned telephone or cable television companies.

Because basic infrastructure is perceived as essential to economic activity (i.e., it is used by most businesses), ensuring adequate access to such services is viewed as necessary to promote economic development goals. Additionally, access to communications and media services is often viewed as important for a number of social goals. For example, it can help maintain community cohesion, support democracy and the functioning of our civil society. Access to advanced communication services can facilitate access and political participation by the elderly or handicapped, can enhance access to educational opportunities, and can support communications between local government and institutions (churches, libraries, recreation) with the citizenry.

While the “basic infrastructure” rationale appears distinct, it may be subsumed as just another example of a “market failure” rationale. For example, the market failure may also arise if the benefits of providing broadband services are not easily appropriated by a private provider. Because of positive network externalities, public goods aspects, and other spillover effects. Therefore, in the balance of this paper, we will focus on the impact of wireless on the incidence and appropriate response to a perceived market failure, while accepting that communities may appropriately regard access to high-speed

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23 Since economists typically focus on efficiency and generally prefer markets to governments for allocating scarce resources, there is a common presumption that market-based provisioning of services is to be preferred whenever it is feasible. However, efficiency is not the only concern for government and the private-ownership/capitalist paradigm that governs the allocation of most services in the economy is neither the only nor necessarily the most efficient mechanism for allocating scarce resources. Thus, while we do not do so here nor believe that it is generally the case, it is possible to support an economic argument in favor of public ownership of infrastructure even when such ownership substitutes for or precludes private ownership.

24 These arise when the value of the network is higher to each subscriber when the number of subscribers increases. A local broadband network may be more valuable to everyone if it is really ubiquitous. For example, schools and community groups could use such an ubiquitous network and be assured that everyone in the community can be reached, and thereby avoid the cost of providing announcements via other channels. With a new service such as “broadband,” early adopters subsidize later adopters and the presence of such positive network externalities may result in a market failure.

25 A hot-spot zone in a downtown area that encourages increased shopping traffic offers public goods benefits since stores that do not support the hot spots but are in the coverage area and benefit from the traffic will still derive benefit.

26 Broadband benefits that enhance community quality of life, political participation, and other social goals that may not be translated into potential revenue for a private service provider.
broadband access services as an important element in basic infrastructure, akin to access to water, power, and roads.\textsuperscript{27}

C. Opportunistic rationale

The third rationale – "opportunistic entry" – is associated with situations where the municipality is doing something else that makes it relatively easy (low cost) for them to expand into offering communication services. In effect, the municipality’s entry into communication services is able to take advantage of scale and scope economies because only an incremental investment is required to expand into communication services.\textsuperscript{28}

The most obvious source of such investments is leveraging off of information technology (IT) investments made for the local governments internal use. For example, the municipality may have installed a backbone fiber network to provide data communication services among government buildings, local schools, and libraries. As IT has become more important in business operations for both private and public enterprises, and with increased interest in eGovernment to increase government efficiency and expand access, local governments have been increasing their investments in IT as part of their normal operations.

Additionally, many MEUs have been motivated to deploy advanced communications infrastructure in order to better manage their electric power business (e.g., SCADA, automatic meter reading, on-line access for customer billing and service).\textsuperscript{29} Once this capability is in place, the incremental cost of offering communication services is obviously lower. Electric power deregulation during the 1990s and the threat of increased competition have increased MEUs’ interest in tapping new revenue streams and to exploit potential scale and scope economies to lower average costs.

Furthermore, with declines in the cost of deploying fiber optic cable, robust forecasts for the growth in demand for high capacity transport services, and the high cost of installing wired infrastructure (acquiring rights-of-way, digging up streets, and

\textsuperscript{27} There is a long-standing debate over how much bandwidth is enough. If one takes the view that basic telephone service is all that one needs, then we already have effective competition and ample alternatives in most locales in the United States. Implicit in the discussion here is the belief that the current generation of broadband services are insufficient to meet the “basic infrastructure” standard that will prevail in the future and that additional investment in new infrastructure is needed to meet this demand.

\textsuperscript{28} Opportunistic, low-cost entry may also arise as a consequence of some other special circumstances. For example, a community may be able to take advantage of special development funds targeted at IT investments, or of a special circumstance. Examples of the latter include the need to upgrade IT capabilities for an upcoming Olympics; or the desire to deploy an advanced sensor net in communities near the US-Mexico or US-Canada border to enhance Homeland Security.

\textsuperscript{29} Osorio (2004) shows that MEUs that have upgraded their facilities to support advanced IT-management of their electric power business are more likely to also offer telecommunication services. Similarly, the cable television operators that were most aggressive early on in offering two-way broadband data services, were those carriers that had earlier been more aggressive in installing two-way capabilities to address the perceived threat from direct broadcast satellite services.
installing conduit), utilities of all sorts (water, electric, gas) and local businesses (campuses, malls, new housing/office developments) have found it opportunistically desirable to install dark fiber when outside plant construction is occurring for other reasons. Such fiber awaits the opportunity for low-cost access technologies to make it useful. As we discuss further below, wireless can play an important role in connecting such fiber to end-users and other network services.

In contrast to wired infrastructure which provides connectivity between specific physical locations (where the wire terminates), wireless infrastructure provides a bubble of connectivity that can blur the boundary between public and private infrastructure, or infrastructure installed for one purpose and its extension for use to serve another. For example, many communities already provide wired access to data services for their internal operations, and for the community via wired connections to the schools and public libraries, including public-access terminals for use by students or by the general public. In addition, public safety services (fire, police, and emergency care) all require access to information services, and in many cases, this includes access to mobile data services. Wireless makes it feasible to extend the reach and access to the general community for services that may originally have been installed solely to serve a specific government office, school, or even, the public safety services.

III. Policy Implications of Wireless for Municipal Networking

Emerging wireless technologies have a number of important effects on the rationale for municipal entry into telecommunications services. First, 

ceteris paribus,

wireless increases incentives for local governments to invest in IT and local infrastructure. Second, wireless impacts the “market failure” rationale in ambiguous ways, which means that we cannot conclude at this stage in our research whether wireless supports or harms the economic case in favor of municipal provisioning of local telecommunications services. Third, when municipalities do decide to enter telecommunication services, wireless has a complex impact on the range of business cases and the selection of public policies that would best support enhanced broadband access.

A. Wireless expands municipal incentives to invest in local IT infrastructure

Wireless expands local government demand for and interest in deploying and adopting IT services and infrastructure. By expanding the range of IT-enhanced services that can be offered and their accessibility and usability (e.g., eGovernment access, community building, at-home health care, utility metering, homeland security), wireless pushes out local government’s demand curve for IT services.\textsuperscript{30} An obvious example that is being widely exploited is installing WLANs in schools and government offices to increase access to existing IT infrastructure and services. Wireless also lowers the costs of supply because it expands the technology choice set. That is, although wireless is not

\textsuperscript{30} Of course, these could be provided by private sector providers. Higher demand reduces the likelihood of a market failure, but also increases motivation to act if market failure continues.
the least expensive technology in all situations, when it is, it lowers the costs of deploying infrastructure.\textsuperscript{31} For example, wireless can offer a low-cost alternative to leased line facilities from the incumbent local telephone company for backhaul interconnections between schools, libraries, and other government buildings in the community.

Wireless technology complements other IT investments, increasing demand for fixed line broadband access (e.g., when a home WLAN allows a DSL or cable modem line to be shared in the home) and for mobile computing equipment, services, and applications. Taken together, these “supply” and “demand” effects mean that local governments will invest more in IT services and equipment. The growth of eGovernment and the investments in local government intranets and in broadband content will provide complementary assets that can lower the incremental costs of entry into telecommunication services.\textsuperscript{32} This will reduce the cost of “opportunistic” entry.

Thus, \textit{ceteris paribus}, wireless seems likely to increase local government incentives to enter into local telecommunications services and implies that local government will play a more important role in how broadband access evolves in the future than it has in the past. Of course, this conclusion could be reversed if the trend towards state or federal regulatory prohibitions against municipal participation in telecommunication services continues.

\textbf{B. Wireless impact on “market failure” rationale is ambiguous}

By lowering entry barriers and the costs of deploying local access networks, wireless may decrease the likelihood of a market failure in any particular community, thereby reducing the need for the municipality to provide communication services. Thus, private WISPs are now finding it profitable to offer services in rural communities that are still under-served by wired-providers. Moreover, the scalability of wireless technologies makes it feasible for private providers to serve smaller markets that may previously have been uneconomic. Finally, wireless may offer a low-cost option for new competitors to over-build wired-provider networks, thereby alleviating concerns about insufficient competition. From this perspective, it would seem that the principal impact of wireless might be to reduce the range of environments vulnerable to a market failure.

Alternatively, in those communities that remain underserved by private providers, wireless may make it feasible for the municipality to provide services – thereby remediying the most severe cases of market failure where even the local government finds it too costly to provide services. For example, wireless makes it feasible for communities to deploy infrastructure in rural areas where the low density makes wired infrastructure prohibitively expensive. Public access to water towers, grain silos or other infrastructure for siting antennas and technologies that use unlicensed spectrum can make deployment

\textsuperscript{31} See Wanichkorn and Sirbu (2002).

\textsuperscript{32} For example, local government efforts to implement eGovernment capabilities and services will require building IT-saavy human capital resources that will also be available to support public access networking if the municipality elects to go that way.
of wireless broadband relatively low cost and easy. Alternatively, in dense urban areas, municipal wireless may be used to promote economic development or to provide low cost broadband access even when higher-cost broadband is available from private sector competitors. For example, Philadelphia is planning to build a wide-coverage-area WiFi network to promote low-cost broadband access in direct competition to higher-priced services offered by Comcast, Verizon, and others. In both cases, the lower cost of wireless makes it feasible for municipal governments to address perceived market failures more readily.

In both cases, some argue that the problem would be better solved by providing private carriers sufficient incentives (e.g., subsidies) to address the market failure (e.g., lack of any service in the rural case and service that is too expensive in the urban) rather than by municipal entry into an industry sector for which they may lack the requisite knowledge and institutional capabilities. On the other hand, there is no a priori reason to believe municipal entry would be inefficient.

In summary, therefore, wireless technology makes both private and municipal entry lower cost. The first effect reduces the number of situations in which a market failure may exist, while the second effect enhances the ability of municipal governments to address market failures. Which effect dominates depends on the nature of the communities under consideration. And, in any case, consumers unambiguously benefit from the increased service and coverage afforded by wireless services. Wireless will expand the range of service choices for all customers.

In addition to the above impacts, there is a sense in which wireless may exacerbate a market failure problem if it turns out that FTTx is a natural monopoly (or oligopoly). That is, by lowering the costs of deploying very-high-bandwidth capable services deep into the neighborhood, wireless may accelerate the deployment of such technologies. This could result in the creation of a natural monopoly as discussed earlier. Some preliminary research suggests that wireless is likely to play a critical role in the deployment of next generation broadband access infrastructure that will depend on fiber deployment deep into neighborhoods. On the other hand, if end-user demand for bandwidth is limited, advances in 3G/4G mobile services, wireless-supported BPL services, and BFWA services may eliminate the last-mile bottleneck altogether.

Finally, wireless may expand the range of situations in which a market failure arises associated with the “basic infrastructure” type of arguments discussed earlier. That is, because wireless broadband results in social returns that exceed appropriable private returns (e.g., economic development benefits of WiFi hotspots in depressed areas or broadband that improves human capital, or furthering non-economic social goals like

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34 See Zhang (2004) provided a discussion of the potential role of wireless in the “100 x 100” project underway at Carnegie Mellon University and several other universities. This project is looking at the challenges for delivering 100Mbps to 100 million homes and 1Gbps to 1 million businesses in the United States.
enhancing community cohesion and political participation). In this case, wireless would accentuate the “market failure” rationale for municipal entry.

C. Wireless impacts the optimal business model for municipal entry into telecommunications services

The diversity of wireless technology options also affects the optimal business model choice for municipalities. While different technologies from different vendors are optimized for different situations, there are usually a number of alternatives that might work in any situation. It is simply not possible to identify an optimal choice without considering the goals and special circumstances in the community.

For example, if the community’s goal is to quickly put in place a solution that will provide some high-speed data access at low cost and with a short investment horizon, then a municipal network based on WiFi hot spots may offer an attractive option. Additionally, local government may be able to economically encourage broadband access by helping to promote or coordinate grass-roots efforts to virally deploy ad hoc networks. The local government could encourage community/neighborhood groups interested in building up a broadband mesh network by allowing them to interconnect their mesh at low cost to local government back-haul services, could provide access to public infrastructure and buildings for siting antennas, and can provide an information clearing house/education role to help grass-roots initiatives take-off. One big problem that confronts such grass-roots networks that wish to scale to higher traffic and wider-scale is how to pay for the backhaul interconnection to the Internet.  

Alternatively, the community may decide that the need for ubiquitous broadband is too great to leave to a viral/grass-roots growth approach and may decide to deploy a MAN-sized network. Whether it opts for a BFWA-type network based on large cell sites which each cover a relatively large area, or a mesh-type network based on many smaller cell sites that are interconnected will have implications for the way services are deployed and what services are deployed (e.g., supporting voice telephony over a mesh-style network may be more difficult, but a mesh may offer more flexible deployment roll-out). The vendors offering these various technologies have emphasized different performance characteristics and the economic/performance trade-offs vary depending on what the network’s principle purpose is.

Finally, if the community is trying to plan for its communication infrastructure needs for the next twenty to thirty years, it may opt for a FTTx system with some form of wireless mesh to provide connectivity to the neighborhood fiber.

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35 Most of the back-haul services for such networks are currently provided via wired DSL or cable modem services that are provided on a flat-monthly fee basis so the incremental cost for the DSL/cable subscriber of sharing this connection via a WiFi “hot spot” is limited to the potential congestion which should be negligible as long as traffic is relatively light. If traffic is more intense or if carriers move to usage-based pricing, these costs will have to be paid. The community could elect to tax itself to recover the revenue needed to pay for backhaul costs.
Wireless technology continues to evolve and communities that wait will be able to take advantage of newer technologies and lower costs, but at the expense of delaying realization of the benefits of improved communication services. A community that adopts one of the newer, more capable systems before it is standardized risks being stranded with an incompatible system; while a community that fails to adopt a comprehensive plan may find itself with a mish-mash of ad hoc networks that are costly to integrate or evolve into a community-wide network. Communities will be challenged by the need to adopt a strategy that can adapt to changing technology and market needs (i.e., scalable to higher speed bandwidth, wider area coverage, and new services).

The choice of technology also has implications for other aspects of municipal policy. For example, if the municipality opts for a technology based on small cell sites, it will need to install or provide access for lots of antenna sites (e.g., antennas on lamp posts); while if it opts for larger cell sites, it may be able to locate the relatively small number of necessary antennas on a few government buildings. These decisions have implications for outside plant maintenance, customer premise equipment costs, system modification costs, and a host of other characteristics that define what services the municipal network can provide and how these evolve.

Moreover, because municipalities represent an important market for vendors of wireless networks and services – for MAN access networks, public safety networks, hot spots, and hybrids of everything in between – the buying decisions of municipalities will impact which technologies succeed in the market place and so will have feedback implications for the broadband industry more generally. Indeed, the municipalities by representing a concentrated locus of demand that is typically quite cost sensitive can offer an important potential early adopter of wireless technology.

Finally, because wireless technology reduces entry barriers for private service providers as well, wireless may change the types of business models that municipalities may seek to employ if they elect to provide telecommunication services in their communities. For example, they may be more inclined to favor private-public partnerships based on a franchise model wherein the municipality provides preferential access for base station siting and commits to adopting a particular technology for its internal use in return for a WISP-franchisee agreeing to install and operate the municipal wireless network. The municipality can use its wireless strategy to encourage additional infrastructure competition from these new types of last-mile access providers.

In summary, therefore, we should expect to see municipalities experimenting with a diverse array of technologies, and we should not be surprised if 20-20 hindsight allows us to identify many errors ex post in the approaches adopted by many of those municipalities that do choose to deploy networks. Fortunately, the low cost of wireless technology and its ability to be implemented incrementally limits the overall risk exposure.
IV. Conclusions

The future of the Internet is broadband, and the future of broadband will involve a large component of wireless services. The high costs of deploying next generation broadband infrastructure are raising questions as to how best to fund the requisite investment. This question is closely related to questions regarding what industry structure will best suit our collective needs for ensuring affordable, universal access to broadband services while at the same time ensuring that consumers have adequate choice and are not at risk from an abuse of unwarranted market power. Furthermore, because broadband requirements and the costs of deploying broadband infrastructure may vary greatly from location to location within a town, across a state, and across the nation, it is unlikely that any “one size fits all” broadband access solution will emerge, or if it does, will be optimal.

In response to these needs, a perception that the private sector may fail to make the requisite investment, offer sufficient choice, or adequate quality of service, and concerns over state and federal regulatory policy for traditional private telephone and cable television service providers has induced a growing number of local governments to consider investing in municipal telecommunication networks to provide broadband access in their communities. The traditional justifications for such a move include concerns that there is a “market failure” that needs to be addressed or that such a move is warranted because of its low incremental cost (given that investments in complementary infrastructure have already been made for another reason). Thus, we have seen a number of rural communities and communities with municipal electric utilities (MEUs) in both urbanized and rural areas decide to offer municipally-provided broadband data services.

At the same time, we are in the midst of a revolution in wireless services that is changing the way broadband services are provided and used, and are impelling convergence of wireless and wireline networks and services. This paper considers the implications of emerging trends in wireless technology for municipal networking and the higher-level implications of wireless technology on the proper or likely role for local governments in providing communication services in the future.

We conclude that wireless technology is likely to increase local government’s demand for and use of IT technology in general, and wireless services in particular, and therefore, local governments will become an even more important player in the last-mile broadband access landscape than they have been heretofore. At the same time, the underlying “market failure” justification for public entry into a market that has previously been served most often by investor-owned firms (at least in the United States) is impacted in ambiguous ways by emerging wireless trends. On the one hand, wireless technologies that lower entry barriers would appear to reduce the likelihood of a market failure and therefore a need for public entry. On the other hand, these same lower costs may make it feasible to address situations where before the failure was so severe as to even have precluded public provisioning. Furthermore, wireless may accelerate the deployment of next generation FTTx systems that, if a natural monopoly, could increase the likelihood that next generation infrastructure will be a natural monopoly. Alternatively, the benefits of wireless may enhance the perception that broadband constitutes essential infrastructure...
that needs to be provided by government because the social benefits of ensuring adequate access to such services exceed what private carriers can expect to appropriate.

This ambiguity makes it impossible at this stage to conclude whether encouraging or restraining municipal entry into communication services will further or harm the public interest. Public involvement in communication services may be a substitute for or a complement to private provisioning. While traditional incumbent local telephone and cable companies have mostly opposed municipal entry (including lobbying for state laws to block such entry), new types of carriers (WISPs) have obviously benefited from such entry. The impact of municipal entry on private sector alternatives (and visa versa) is complex. Competition from a municipality may work like competition from any other source as a spur to incumbents to lower costs and improve quality. On the other hand, a non-profit government-owned provider may have reduced incentives to be efficient and yet have both the opportunity and incentive to engage in anticompetitive strategies, thereby reducing community access to private alternatives. Empirical research measuring the economic performance (prices, quality, costs, investment) of broadband access services in communities with and without municipal providers will shed useful light on this debate.

Finally, even if a municipality elects to provide telecommunications services, its optimal choice is complex and unlikely to become simpler in the near future in light of on-going wireless trends. Choosing the optimal strategy (network architecture, business model, service model) will depend on local conditions, community goals, and on-going technical and market changes that remain subject to substantial uncertainty. Because this preliminary research suggests that municipalities will have a growing need and desire to confront this uncertainty and to deploy wireless services – for their own internal needs, if not also for their communities – further research is needed. Additional studies of the costs and benefits of deploying alternative technologies are needed that will allow municipalities to make “apples-to-apples” comparisons, and when that is not possible, at least to map the spectrum of wireless options appropriately to local circumstances. These engineering design/cost studies also need to be evaluated with respect to the business model and public policy environment in which the technology will be provided.

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36 Sappington and Sidak (2003) discuss the incentives for a publicly-owned enterprise to engage in anticompetitive activities. While their analysis does not lead to a conclusion that municipal provisioning of services would be less efficient or more prone to anticompetitive behavior, it does identify the risk posed to sustainable competition from municipal entry.
References


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